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Highlights: 
1. Tests a novel procedure to elicit subjective life expectancy. 
2. The novel frequency procedure elicits a conceptually precise measure along a point estimate 
procedure. 
3. Finds that the frequency procedure is less vulnerable to a framing effect than a percentage 
procedure. 
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Abstract: Survey measures of subjective expectations manifest anomalies in how people 
report percentages. The current research finds that frequency-based measures deliver more 
valid subjective probabilities of living to a given age than do questions that elicit a percentage 
chance.  
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Asking for Frequencies rather than Percentages Increases the Validity of Subjective 1 
Probability Measures: Evidence from Subjective Life Expectancy 2 
1. Introduction 3 
Behaviour is informed by subjective expectations. Despite the importance of accurately 4 
eliciting subjective expectations, there is a lack of consensus on the most suitable approach. 5 
In the domain of life expectancy elicitation, for instance, the Health and Retirement Survey 6 
(HRS) and the English Longitudinal Study of Aging (ELSA) use a percentage procedure that 7 
asks people to estimate the percentage chance that they will be alive at a given age whereas 8 
the Survey of Consumer Finances and the Health and Aging in Scotland survey (HAGIS) ask 9 
respondents for a point estimate of how long they will live. This difference in approach has 10 
consequences: studies that have compared the life expectancies implied by these two 11 
procedures find a large and systematic divergence (Wu, Stevens and Thorp, 2015; Comerford 12 
and Robinson, 2017).   13 
Each of the point-estimate procedure and the percentage procedure has its disadvantages. The 14 
point-estimate procedure is conceptually ambiguous: it could be eliciting a mode, median, 15 
mean or something else (Douglas, Comerford and Bell, 2018). Numerical probabilities are 16 
conceptually precise but, in practice, survey questions that ask people to report percentages 17 
deliver noisy and biased responses. For instance, many respondents report 50% to indicate 18 
that they have no idea of the correct probability (Fischhoff and Bruine de Bruin, 1999). This 19 
“50% blip” in responses to life expectancy questions led the HRS survey administrators to 20 
add a follow-up question to determine what respondents actually meant by answering “50%”. 21 
In 2006, 23 percent of respondents reported their probability of living to 75 as 50%. Just 37 22 
percent of those went on to report that it was as likely as not that they would live to 75 (Hurd, 23 
2009). 24 
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The contribution of the current research is to offer evidence on the validity of a novel 25 
approach to eliciting life expectancy. I ask people for a frequency measure of their likelihood 26 
of being alive at age 75. Experiments show that laypeople make more normative judgments 27 
when presented with statistical information as a frequency (e.g. 1 in 100) than when 28 
presented with the same information as a percentage (e.g. 1%). With the frequency format, 29 
people are less likely to neglect base rates and their judgments more closely approximate 30 
Bayesian reasoning (e.g. Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 2005). I predict that the frequency 31 
procedure will deliver more valid measures of life expectancy than the percentage procedure, 32 
while also avoiding the conceptual ambiguity of the point-estimate procedure. 33 
To assess the validity of the frequency format, I compare it against the percentage procedure 34 
for sensitivity to a) a framing effect that should not predict life expectancy and b) a 35 
respondent characteristic that would be expected to predict life expectancy, age.  36 
Before introducing the study, let me clarify how the framing effect and respondents’ age 37 
relate to the current research. The framing effect is that subjective life expectancy tends to be 38 
years shorter when respondents are asked about the percentage chance they will be dead by 39 
age x than when asked about the percentage chance of being alive at age x (Payne et al., 40 
2013). Difficulties with reporting percentages appear to be a cause of this effect because the 41 
effect reduces in magnitude and reverses direction when subjective life expectancies are 42 
elicited by a point-estimate procedure i.e. what age will you [live to /die at?] (Comerford and 43 
Robinson, 2017). A valid elicitation procedure should attenuate this live-to / die-by framing 44 
effect. 45 
Respondents’ age should predict their subjective life expectancy because objective life 46 
expectancy at birth increased in the US by 0.19 years each year between 1950 (current age: 47 
68) and 2000 (current age: 18) (National Vital Statistics Report, 2002). If the respondents in 48 
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my study, 98 percent of whom are aged between 18 and 68, are sensitive to this increase in 49 
life expectancy then we would expect to see a negative coefficient on respondents’ current 50 
age in our subjective life expectancy measure.  51 
In summary, if the frequency procedure is less sensitive to the framing effect and more 52 
sensitive to age than the percentage procedure, then the frequency procedure looks to be 53 
eliciting more meaningful measures of life expectancy than the percentage procedure.  54 
2. Study 55 
I manipulate whether respondents are asked the chance that they will live to age 75 or die by 56 
age 75. In an orthogonal manipulation, I vary whether respondents are asked to report a 57 
percentage chance or a frequency.  58 
2.1. Methods 59 
I recruited 566 US-based respondents on Amazon Mechanical Turk on February 18
th
 2019. 60 
To insure that my respondents were attentive, I included an instructional manipulation check 61 
at the beginning of the survey (Oppenheimer, Meyvis and Davidenko, 2009) and 104 62 
respondents who failed this attention check were routed out of the survey, leaving 462 63 
respondents (67 percent female, mean age = 39, age range: 18 - 87). 64 
The survey opened with the following text:  65 
This is a question to elicit your estimate of how likely it is that you will still be alive by a 66 
given age.  67 
This sort of question is asked in certain surveys to estimate people’s decisions and behaviors 68 
around health, retirement etc.   69 
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Immediately beneath this text respondents saw one of the questions presented in Table 1. 70 
There then followed some questions on macroeconomic trends for a separate study. The 71 
survey closed by eliciting age, gender and five numeracy questions related to percentages 72 
(Weller et al., 2013).  73 
Table 1: Question wordings by condition 






Taking into account genes, habits, preferences, health history etc., the 




Taking into account genes, habits, preferences, health history etc., the 
percentage chance that I will die at 75 years old or younger is ... 
Frequency 
cond. live-to 
Imagine 100 people who are absolutely identical to you right now – they have 
the same genes, habits, preferences, health history etc. 




Imagine 100 people who are absolutely identical to you right now – they have 
the same genes, habits, preferences, health history etc. 
Of those 100, how many will die at 75 years old or younger? 
 74 
2.2. Results 75 
I subtracted the raw responses made in the die-by conditions from 100 to deliver subjective 76 
probabilities of being alive at age 75. Subjective probability of being alive at age 75 is the 77 
dependent measure in all analyses reported below.  78 
Figure 1 graphs this dependent variable by condition. Each condition should show an equal 79 
likelihood of being alive at age 75 because the randomization process did not result in any 80 
observable differences across the live-to/ die-by conditions in terms of age, gender or 81 
numeracy (all ps > 0.30).  82 
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  83 
Figure 1: Subjective Probability of Being Alive at Age 75 84 
Figure 1 shows a live-to / die-by framing effect consistent with that reported in Payne et al. 85 
(2013): the live-to frame had a significant positive effect in the percentage condition (b = 22, 86 
t = 6.85, p < .001) and also had a significant, though smaller, effect in the frequency 87 
condition (b = 7, t = 2.18, p = .031)   This live-to/ die-by framing effect was attenuated by the 88 
frequency condition. An OLS regression shows that, after controlling for age, gender, 89 
numeracy and main effects of the live-to frame and the percentage change procedure, the 90 
interaction of the live-to condition and the percentage condition is positive and statistically 91 
significant (t = 3.34, p = .001, see Table 2, Model 1). 92 
This result is not explained by a difference across procedures in the likelihood of responding 93 
“50”; the two procedures performed similarly in this respect (frequency procedure: 16%; 94 
percentage procedure: 15%; z = .45, p = .651). 95 
In the percentage condition, a regression that controls for the live-to frame and gender finds 96 
















frequency condition          
die-by 
Subjective probability of being alive at age 75 
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predict will die younger, estimated a higher probability of living to 75 than those born later 98 
(model 2: b = 0.172, t = 1.52, p = .129). In the frequency condition, an analogous regression 99 
finds the expected sign (model 3: b = -.110, t = .92, p = .359). Model 4 of Table 2 assesses 100 
whether respondents’ age is a stronger negative predictor of probability of living to 75 in the 101 
frequency condition than in the percentage condition. The independent variable of interest is 102 
the Age*percentage condition interaction, which shows that age is significantly less negative 103 
a predictor in the percentage condition than in the frequency condition (model 4: b = .287, t = 104 
1.73, one-sided  p = .042).  105 
Table 2: OLS regressions of Self-reported Probability of Living to 75 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Percentage condition -5.383   -9.233 
 (3.159)   (6.862) 
Live-to condition 7.245* 22.411 7.323 14.884** 
 (3.180) (3.181)** (3.184)* (2.273) 
Percentage cond*live-to cond 15.006**    
 (4.498)    
Age 0.040 0.172 -0.110 -0.123 
 (0.082) (0.113) (0.120) (0.121) 
Gender 1.921 -0.782 4.425 1.888 
 (2.368) (3.447) (3.256) (2.390) 
Numeracy 1.664* 1.384 1.817 1.649* 
 (0.694) (0.990) (0.973) (0.701) 
Age*Percentage condition    0.287
a
 
    (0.166) 
Constant 46.514** 47.570** 41.094** 48.973** 
 (5.755) (7.717) (8.246) (6.591) 
R
2
 0.12 0.05 0.19 0.10 
N 459 230 229 459 
Notes: coefficients highlighted in bold are those referred to in the text.  
* p < .05, ** p < .01, 
a
 p < .05 in one-sided test 
 106 
Discussion 107 
Previous research suggests that researchers face a trade-off when choosing how to elicit 108 
subjective expectations: they can either use a percentage chance procedure that respondents 109 
struggle to answer but that asks about a conceptually precise measure; or else they can use a 110 
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point-estimate procedure that is easier for the respondent to answer but is less conceptually 111 
meaningful (Douglas, Comerford and Bell, 2018). The current research suggested that 112 
eliciting a frequency might offer the best of both options – a question that respondents can 113 
meaningfully answer and that delivers an unambiguous numerical estimate for construction 114 
of a full probability distribution. In support of this suggestion, I found that the frequency 115 
elicitation procedure yielded estimates of life expectancy that were less sensitive to a framing 116 
effect and were more sensitive to an objective predictor of life expectancy than did the 117 
widely-used percentage chance procedure. These results are consistent with evidence that 118 
laypeople better approximate Bayesian reasoning when working with frequencies than when 119 
working with percentages (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 2005). 120 
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